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Abstract 
The foundation of an Islamic country and the implementation of Islamic laws were the primary goals of the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. Many laws and regulations were changed and revised in order to conform to Shari’ah 
law. Therefore, one of the most critical laws adopted after the Revolution and rooted in Shari’ah law, which strictly 
forbids riba (interest), is the Riba-Free Banking Act of 1983. After three decades, a case can be made that it is has 
not been entirely successful in eliminating riba from Iran’s banking system. While all Iranian banks allegedly follow 
the prohibition of riba, in practice they cannot afford to fully adopt the Islamic doctrine in this manner. With 
practical work experience in a financial institution in Iran, I thoroughly understand the distance between theory 
and the reality of the riba-free banking system in Iran. Specifically, with study and review of term investment 
deposit accounts, we argue that post-revolutionary changes in the banking system of Iran did not result in the so-
called elimination of riba from Iran’s financial structure. Iranian banks continue to pay a fixed and predetermined 
interest in the form of a new phrase: provisional profit. 
 
 
 
* LL.M in International Economic and Business Law, University of Tehran, Iran. Askariye Credit Institution, Legal 
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I. Introduction 
Foundation of an entirely functional Islamic country and the implementation of Islamic laws 
were the primary goals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Precipitant process of 
Islamization of Iran started right after the fall of the Shah of Persia. Necessary measures were 
taken to build an Islamic country. Many laws and regulations were changed and revised in 
order to conform and harmonize with Shari’ah law. Shari’ah law provides directions for all 
spheres of Muslim life including daily affairs, matrimony, rituals, politics, and family 
obligations and, of course, provides instructions for financial activities as well. Therefore, 
Shari’ah plays an indispensable role in the governance of banking activities in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. One of the most important and critical laws adopted after the Revolution that 
was rooted in Shari’ah law, forbidding riba (interest) is the Riba-Free Banking Act of 1983. The 
Act is drawn up so as to ensure that the banking system of Iran complies with Shari’ah rules. 
After three decades of its adoption, a case can be made that it is not entirely successful in 
eliminating riba from the Iran’s banking system. While all of the banks and financial 
institutions in Iran allegedly follow the prohibition of riba, in practice they cannot afford to 
fully adopt the Islamic doctrine in this manner. With actual work experience in a financial 
institution in Iran, I thoroughly understand the distance between theory and practice of the 
riba-free banking system in Iran. Specifically, with the study and review of the term investment 
deposit accounts, we argue that post-revolutionary changes in the banking system of Iran did 
not result in the so-called elimination of riba from the country’s financial structure. Iranian 
banks continue to pay a fixed and predetermined interest known by a new phrase: ‘provisional 
profit’. 
In the first part of this paper, we briefly define riba and its prohibition in Islam and expound on 
the Riba-Free Banking Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Muslim and non-Muslim scholars 
have written ad nauseam in this regard, and different aspects of riba and Islamic banking have 
been described in detail.1 However, the fact that Iran’s banking system continues to follow 
interest-based banking and how it found a way to circumvent the Act has never been studied. 
Accordingly in the second part of this paper, we exclusively study term investment deposit 
accounts. 
II. Riba 
The word riba means ‘increase’ as interpreted by Imam Razi. It corresponds to the word 
‘interest’ as defined by Webster's New World Dictionary.2 In both cases, increase refers to the 
amount beyond what is owed.3 In Arabic language, riba, is also known as ‘usury’, which means 
excess or addition, an effortless profit, the ‘premium’ that must be paid by the borrower to the 
 
1  For further study, see: THOMAS ABDULKADER, Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba, London/New York 
2006; RAHMAN FAZLUR, Riba and Interest, Islamic Studies 1964, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1-43; AHMAD ZIAUDDIN, The Theory of 
Riba, Islamic Studies 1978, Vol. 17, No. 4, 171-185. 
2  As defined by Webster’s New World Dictionary, interest means: “a charge for borrowed money generally a percentage 
of the amount borrowed”. 
3  SIDDIEQ NOORZOY M., Islamic Laws on Riba (Interest) and Their Economic Implications, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 1982, Vol. 14, No. 1, 3-17, at 3. 
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lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension of its 
maturity, a tool of oppression, and a means to unjustly take the money of others by exploiting 
their needs and circumstances.4 Prohibition of riba is one of the core subjects and distinctive 
features of Islamic beliefs and is widely reflected in the Holy Qurʾan and Hadiths.5 The 
prohibition of riba is mentioned in four different chapters (Sura) in the Holy Qurʾan. These are 
Sura Al-Baqara (Chapter 2: verses 275 – 280), Sura Al-Imran (Chapter 2: verses 130 – 132), Al- 
Nisa (Chapter 4: verse 161), and Al- Rum (Chapter 30: verse 39). To avoid rehash, we mention 
just two important verses in this context:6 
“And if you do not [abandon what remains of usury], then be informed of a 
war from Allah and His apostle. And if you repent, then you will have your 
principal, neither harming others, nor suffering harm.”7 
“And for their taking usury though they had been forbidden from it and for 
eating up the wealth of the people wrongfully. And We have prepared for the 
faithless among them a painful punishment.”8 
There are also many Hadiths on the prohibition of riba. 
“The Prophet said: riba has seventy segments, the least serious being 
equivalent to a man committing adultery with his own mother.”9 
“The Prophet said: the receiver and the payer of riba, the one who records it 
and the witness to the transaction, they are all alike in guilt of this sin.”10 
By studying the Holy Qurʾan and Hadiths, we note that the attitude of Islam toward riba is far 
harsher than for other sins such as adultery, alcohol consumption, gambling, cruelty, and 
murder11 in so far as it is considered blasphemy and receivers of riba have been declared to be 
at war against Allah and Mohammad (His Messenger). The Holy Qurʾan provides no 
explanation as to why riba is prohibited, and different reasons have been purported by Islamic 
scholars and jurisprudence throughout history. In this paper, the reason behind the prohibition 
of riba is not discussed. 
 
 
4  BOTIS SORINA, Shari’ah Concepts in Islamic Banking, Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov, Series V: 
Economic Sciences 2013, Vol. 6 (55) No. 2, 139-146. 
5  A collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet Muhammad, which constitute a major source of guidance for 
Muslims apart from the Qurʾan. 
6  The verses are from The Holy Qurʾan: Translation and Commentary (1934) by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
7  Sura Al-Baqara, Chapter 2: Verse 278. 
8  Sura Al-Nisa, Chapter 4: Verse 161. 
9  AL-AAMILI SHAIKH AL-HUR,   ُلیصفتُلئاسوُهعیشلاُیلاُلیصحَتُلئاسمُهعیرشلا (Wasā'il al-Shīʿa), Qom 
1993, Vol. 18, at 122. 
10  AL-AAMILI, supra n. 9, at 126. 
11  HUSSAYN TABATABAEI MUHAMMAD (Allameh Tabatabaei), ریسفتُنازیملا  (Tafsir al-Mizan), Qom 1417 AH, 
Vol. 2, at 628. 
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III. Riba-Free Banking Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Gradually, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the nationalization of Iranian banks,12 
reception of any kind of interest faded away from Iran’s financial system. With the adoption of 
Iran’s Riba-Free Banking Act in 1983, for the first time in modem history, the Islamization of 
the banking system was implemented in the financial sector of the economy as a whole.13 As 
Ayatollah H. Rafsanjani expressed, “this Act was adopted to found a system of riba-free 
banking in the Muslim world.”14 However, after three decades, the major question still looms 
large as to whether this Act has been able to go beyond the idea of Islamic banking and 
implement Islamic principles in Iran’s banking system. In this paper, we argue that the Riba-
Free Banking Act has failed to fulfill its duty in practice and riba emerged in Iran’s banking 
system, with a new face called provisional profit. Later, using empirical examples of term 
investment deposits and the provisions currently being used by the banks and financial 
institutions in Iran, we argue that this so-called provisional profit is riba in the context of 
Islamic finance. 
The first chapter of the Riba-Free Banking Act expresses the goals and duties of the banking 
system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sections 8 and 9 of Art. 2 of this chapter relate directly to 
our discussion. They state that: 
“[…] 
8. [Banks have the duties of] Opening of various Gharz-al-hasaneh (current 
and savings) accounts and accepting Term Investment Deposits and issuance 
of relevant certificates, as required by the Act and the regulations.  
9. [Banks have the duties of] Granting of loans and credits free of riba charges 
in accordance with the Act and the regulations.” 
These two sections of Art. 2 perfectly describe and define the core functions of banks as 
financial intermediaries in Iran’s financial system. Religious philosophy aside, from a 
functionalist perspective, there is no difference between Iranian banking and conventional 
banking. In both systems, banks raise funds by opening different types of accounts and taking 
deposits and grant these funds to those who need them. The difference lies within the 
implementation of these functions. In contrast to conventional banking, when performing their 
roles, Iranian banks must follow the Islamic principle on the prohibition of interest and 
Qurʾanic injunctions against riba. Obviously, prohibition of riba has a major effect on both 
classic functions of banks. In the next section, we closely study the concept of term investment 
deposits as a common tool for the mobilization of monetary resources and examine how 
Iranian banks cope with the Islamic principle in practice. 
 
12  Nationalization of Banks Act approval by Revolutionary Council dated June 1979. 
13  VALIBEIGI MEHRDAD, Banking and Credit Rationing Under the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Studies 1992, Vol. 25, 
No. 3/4 , 51-65, at 56. 
14  KASHANI MAHMOOD, شلاچیاهُنوناقُیرادکنابُناریا  (Problems in the Iran’s Banking Law), Legal Research 
Journal 2005, Vol. 42, 11-68, at 23. 
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IV. Term Investment Deposits 
Art. 3 of the Riba-Free Banking Act authorizes Iranian banks to accept deposits under each of 
the following titles: (A) Gharz-al-hasaneh Deposits: 1-current and 2-savings and (B) term 
investment deposits. According to this article, term investment deposits, for which the bank 
enjoys the power of attorney for their utilization, shall be used in Mosharka, Mozarebeh, hire-
purchase, installment transactions, Mozara-ah, Mosaqat, direct investment, forward dealings, 
and Joaalah transactions. Art. 5 states that the profit from said transactions (the ennealogy 
Islamic contracts), proportional to the duration and amount of the investment deposit, should 
be divided among the owners after deduction of the bank’s expenses and fees.  
Thus, on the basis of the above provisions of this Act, Iranian banks, under the terms of the 
agency contract, act as agents of the depositors to invest the deposited funds in said 
transactions (the ennealogy Islamic contracts). Upon completion of the contract period and 
final calculation, the profits (losses) are shared between the agent (the bank) and the 
entrepreneur. Therefore, the bank’s profits and consequently the profits of their client (the 
depositor) are not at all assured or secured. For example, when opening a long-term 
investment deposit with Saman Bank (a famous privately owned Iranian bank), under the 
conditions of the long-term investment deposit account: 
“Saman Bank as the agent of the long-term investment depositor, with full 
power of substitution, in accordance with the Riba-Free Banking Act can invest 
the depositor’s funds. The profit of said investment after the deduction of the 
bank’s fees, conforming to the relevant regulations and rules and proportional 
to the duration and amount of the investment deposit, shall be paid to the 
depositor or his substitute.”  
Further, according to the conditions for long-term investment deposit account stipulated by 
Bank Maskan (an Iranian government-owned bank): 
“Bank Maskan, on behalf of and as an agent of the depositor, use the deposited 
funds in accordance with the Riba-Free Banking Act and the profit, conforming 
to the relevant regulations and rules, will be paid, with the right of 
compromise, proportional to the duration and amount of the deposited fund.” 
All Iranian banks and financial institutions have the same clause in their agency contracts with 
more or less similar wording. 
Most Islamic contracts are based on profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) and not on a lender-borrower 
relationship, and Islamic law demands that the provider of funds should share the risk with 
the entrepreneur if he wishes to earn a profit.15 There are no guarantees that there will always 
be a profit in most of the said contracts. The PLS scheme is inherently risky while bank 
investment depositors are generally ordinary, risk-averse people who desire a fixed, decent, 
and risk-free income from their investment deposits. However, in Islamic banking, investment 
 
15  ROY DELWIN A., Islamic Banking, Middle Eastern Studies 1991, Vol. 27, No. 3, 427-456, at 431. 
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depositors are treated as if they are shareholders and are thus entitled to a share of the profits 
or losses made by the bank16 as their agent. In addition to the high-risk nature of these 
transactions, this method of banking demands that profit (or loss) should be divided at the end 
of the Islamic contract period between the bank and the entrepreneur. In other words, Iranian 
investment depositors face two risks; first of all, there is no guarantee that any profit will be 
made. Second, let us assume for the sake of argument that the bank makes a profit. In such 
case, there is still no immediate profit payment to the investment depositors. The assumed 
profit is paid at the end of the contract period. These two high-risk features of Islamic banking, 
without a doubt, increase uncertainty and change the savings behavior of the Iranian people. 
Lack of motivation to invest money in term investment deposits would result in liquidity crisis, 
which would place banks in a poorer position. 
Islamic law forbids fixed or predetermined returns on financial transactions, not an uncertain 
rate of return represented by profit.17 Therefore, Iranian banks needed to design an investment 
deposit model in which the existence of predetermined interest is ruled out but still attractive 
and secure enough for Iranian citizens to invest. To solve the motivation problem and create 
sufficient assurance among investors, Iran’s banking system adopted the strategy of 
provisional profit payments.  Provisional profit is a predetermined and fixed amount of money 
paid prior to the expiration of the ennealogy Islamic contract period and calculation of final 
profit (or loss).18 Paying this predetermined and fixed profit (i.e., provisional profit), with the 
current terms and conditions, makes the Iranian banking system equivalent to an interest-
based banking system. 
1. Provisional Profit in Iran’s Banking System 
According to Art. 4 of the Riba-Free Banking Act, banks may undertake and/or insure the 
principals of term investment deposits. However, no single article in the said Act or its 
regulations points to provisional profit payments. Art. 10 of the Implementing Regulations of 
the Act passed on December 18, 1983 by the Cabinet prohibits the payment of any kind of 
predetermined profit to Term Investment Depositors. To highlight the importance of this rule, 
even the Implementing Guideline of the Act, passed by the Money and Credit Council on 
February 27, 1983, expresses this dictum. Art. 14 states: 
“The banks cannot declare and/or pay any predetermined profit to Term 
Investment Deposit accounts.”19 
Despite this explicit stipulation in Art. 14, Art. 21 of the same Implementing Guideline 
surprisingly uses the phrase provisional profit for the first time in the history of banking in 
Iran. This article authorizes banks to pay provisional profit in specified circumstances. As 
discussed above, after the expiration of the agency contract period, the final and actual profits 
 
16  KHAN MOHSIN S./MIRAKHOR ABBAS, Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 1998, Vol. 38, No. 2, 353-375, at 355. 
17  KHAN/MIRAKHOR, supra n. 16, at 354. 
18  JALILI HOSSEIN MIR,  لئاسمُیرادکنابُنودبُهرهبُردُهبرجتُناریا (Interest-free Banking Experience in 
Iran), Research and Economic Policy 2002, Vol. 22, 127-152, at 128. 
19 Emphasis added by the author. 
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(losses) are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur. According to this article, however, 
if the client, prior to the expiration of the contract period, decides to dissolve the agency 
contract, “the profit will be calculated on a provisional basis, and the final and actual profit will 
be paid at the end of the fiscal year.” Therefore, payment of any kind of provisional profit is 
evidently supposed to be a simple solution in cases of dissolution. This exceptional solution 
should not be generalized and extended whatsoever.  
It has been proven many times throughout human history that Necessitas non habet legem, and 
certainly Iran’s banking system cannot change this hard-set rule. On January 15, 1992, Iran’s 
banking system took a giant leap toward interest-based banking. The Money and Credit 
Council, at its 758th session, in order to create a safe and secure investment environment, 
decreed that: “[T]he granting of any kind of benefits and profits such as guaranteed profit, 
provisional profit, […] are clear examples of banking, monetary and credit activities that banks 
and credit institutions who are authorized by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
are permitted to do.”20 Although the Money and Credit Council, as one of the pillars of the 
Central Bank, is “in a position to consider and decide on the general policy of the Central Bank 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to supervise the monetary and banking affairs of the 
country”21 it unquestionably cannot enact a regulation that violates the letter or the spirit of the 
Riba-Free Banking Act. Enactment of such regulation is a blatant violation of Islamic banking, 
which is formed on the basis of necessity. In consonance with the said regulation, Iranian 
banks explicitly and impudently undertake to pay a monthly provisional profit to depositors. 
For example, Saman Bank’s agreement states: “The share of long-term investment profits, 
according to relevant regulations, is calculated provisionally and will be paid on a monthly 
basis to the depositor's account. The final settlement in respect of the actual profit shall be 
made at the end of each fiscal year.”  
In past years, the Money and Credit Council has determined various rates for provisional 
profit. The provisional profit rate is always a function of the inflation rate. Currently, under a 
directive of the Money and Credit Council dated June 24, 2014,22 the provisional profit rate is as 
follows: 
Maximum Provisional Profit Rate of Investment 
Deposit Accounts in Iran’s Banking System 
Type of Deposit Accounts Percentage of Annual Provisional Profit 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 10.0 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Three Months to Less than Six Months) 
14.0 
 
20  Emphasis added by the author. 
21  Article 18 of the Monetary and Banking Act of Iran, adopted on July 9th 1971 and revised on January 11, 2014. 
22  Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Press Release, available at http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/11923.aspx, last 
accessed on 28 December 2015. 
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Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Six Months to less than Nine Months) 
16.0 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Nine Months to Less than One Year) 
18.0 
Long-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(One Year) 
22.0 
2. Legal Nature of Provisional Profit under Shari’ah Principles 
As discussed above, until the expiration or dissolution of the agency contract, depositors are 
not entitled to receive any kind of profits (losses). So the main question is how to justify the 
legal nature of provisional profit under Shari’ah’s financial principles. 
Basically, the concept of provisional profit is that a bank pays a fixed and predetermined profit 
to a depositor provided that after the final calculation and determination of each party’s share 
(the bank as the agent and the entrepreneur), if the amount paid as provisional profit is less 
than the actual and final profit, the bank will pay the differential amount to the depositor. 
However, if the actual and final profit is less than the provisional profit, the depositor must 
return the differential amount to the bank. Contrary to interest-based banking, where the 
interest immediately becomes the lender’s property without any element of consideration or 
conditions, the ownership of provisional profit does not unconditionally pass to the depositor 
and the depositor is obliged to return the differential amount to the bank. This conditional 
transfer of ownership means provisional profit is more like a loan.  By way of explanation, 
when opening a term investment deposit account, two contractual relationships are formed 
between the bank and the customer. Based on the first explicit relationship, under the agency 
contract, the customer appoints the bank as his representative for investment. Under the 
second relationship, the bank loans a monthly fixed and predetermined amount of money to 
the depositor. This regular payment in the form of an implicit loan contract creates sufficient 
incentive among depositors to keep their fund in deposit accounts. After determining the 
agent’s (the bank’s) share of the final profit on the investment, the bank—after deducting of 
expenses and fees—gives the final profit to the principal (the depositor).  
On the other hand, the depositor must also pay off his loan to the bank. Consequently, when 
two parties are indebted to one another at the same time, their debts are annulled by a set-off to 
the extent of the amount owed by both parties. To that extent, the parties are released from 
their mutual debts.23 Finally, if, after the set-off, one party still owes money to the other, the 
debtor must settle his account. 
As long as the Iranian banks are committed to the theoretical principals of this approach (as 
described above), the elements of insecurity and instability will be the main hallmarks that 
 
23  The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1935), Art. 295. 
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distinguish provisional profit in Islamic banking from interest in conventional banking. 
Insecurity and instability mean that depositors have no assurance that any profit will be made 
and the rate of profit remains unknown. Theoretically, it is possible that after the final 
calculations, depositors who participate in investment may lose all their funds and hence must 
restore the total amount of provisional profit to the bank. As a result, “the cost of being a 
Muslim”24 can be extraordinary high for ordinary Iranian citizens. 
3. Provisional Profit in Practice 
The current and actual practice of Iranian banks in light of the provisional profit payment 
scheme is paradoxical to the Islamic injunction against riba. The difference between 
‘provisional profit’ and ‘interest’ is not supposed to be a mere technicality or choice of 
vocabulary. There is a profound conceptual difference between these two approaches. The 
elements of insecurity and instability mentioned above are the key fundamental distinction. If 
these indispensable elements are detached from the scheme, we will only have a rhetorical 
dichotomy or, in the words of Mr. DELWIN A. ROY, “[a] cosmetic operation that may show an 
Islamic bank's inability to perform in a truly Islamic manner.”25 
Practical procedures of Iranian banks in the years following the adoption of the provisional 
profit scheme absolutely eliminated the elements of insecurity and instability. Performance of 
the banking system in Iran over the last 23 years, especially the method of calculating final and 
actual profit, has created and shaped a surety and certainty in society that provisional profit is 
indeed actual profit. During these years, there has not been a single case of withdrawal of extra 
profit from depositors. Oddly enough, not a single case in which actual profit is less than 
provisional profit is on record. It has been consistently proven that the most skilled financial 
and investment experts make mistakes in predicting the investment environment but 
surprisingly, Iranian banks have always been profitable and paid provisional profit as the 
minimum final and actual profit. Undoubtedly, the reason for this is to keep customers 
satisfied and avoid losing funds. However, this practice of Iranian banks has caused depositors 
not to consider provisional profit as a temporary loan.  
The result is that the crucial elements of insecurity and instability are separated and detached 
from the scheme. Provisional profit is calculated based on the simple above-mentioned rate 
formula and is paid on a monthly basis to depositors. Depositors have no obligations or 
responsibilities to banks. They regularly receive their provisional profit, and Iranian banks set 
provisional profit rates and treat them as the final profit rates at the end of the fiscal year. 
Many people are not even aware of the provisional profit structure. As far as they are 
concerned, they like to receive a monthly fixed and risk-free income from their investment. In 
the current banking system of Iran, provisional profit has the same meaning and function as 
interest in conventional banking. As one of Iran’s current Parliament members said: 
“Provisional profit is just an estimated figure so the depositors know the ballpark figure of the 
profit they are going to make. Of course, after auditing, the actual profit should be announced 
 
24  ABDUL-RAHMAN YAHIA, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance: Tools and Techniques for Community-Based 
Banking, New Jersey 2010, at 199. 
25  ROY, supra n. 15, at 431. 
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and the final profit rate will necessarily vary from the provisional profit rate.”26 The current 
scheme, regardless of the name chosen for it, contains a fixed predetermined risk-free rate of 
return on investment and definitely does not differ in essence and nature from the interest-
based system. 
V. Solution 
In accordance with the Act and regulations, funds obtained by banks from investment deposits 
can be used through ennealogy Islamic contracts. These ennealogy contracts can be simply 
divided into two categories: The first category is based on the PLS scheme and includes 
Mosharka, Mozarebeh, Mozara-ah, Mosaqat, Joaalah, direct investment, and forward dealings. 
In this category, entrepreneurs are not guarantee a predetermined and fixed profit, and 
financing operations are based on an unknown rate of return derived from the PLS. The second 
category consists of hire-purchase contracts and Installment Transactions. As defined in Art. 47 
of the Implementing Regulations, a hire-purchase contract is a lease contract in which the bank 
purchases goods for their clients and under the conditions stipulated in the contract, 
ownership gradually passes to the tenant with the payment of installments. The same scenario 
is true in the case of installment transactions. The rent in hire-purchase contracts and sales 
prices in installment transactions are determined by taking the bank’s cost and profit into 
account. Thus, contrary to the first category, the rate of return is clear and defined at the initial 
stage. 
The difference between the bank’s profits in the first category and profits in the latter category 
is quite obvious. In the first category, banks are expected to make a profit. There is no guarantee 
that such profit will be made, as profits may be much greater than the expected sum. This is the 
nature of the PLS scheme. However, in the second category, the bank’s profits are guaranteed 
and the entrepreneur must pay the guaranteed profit, which means there is no risk. 
To fully adapt to Shari’ah principles and solve the riba dilemma, the Iranian banking system 
should design two types of accounts. The first type should be based on the PLS scheme (the 
first category of contracts as mentioned above). There is no predetermined and fixed profit for 
this type of account so it is suitable for those who wish to take more risk to make more profit. 
On the other hand, the second type is a risk-free account. This type of account is based on the 
second category of contracts. These contracts have a fixed rate of return and are fully be 
functional in the framework of Shari’ah principles and the Act as they are not based on the PLS 
scheme. For this type of account, banks are not participating in a risky business with an 
unknown rate of return. However, determination of a fixed profit rate is not prohibited in these 
accounts. Thus, Iranian Banks can pay a fixed and definite profit at specified intervals to 
depositors. This is precisely why the problem of provisional profit payments is avoided in 
these accounts. Without a doubt, the amount of profit in this type of account is reduced 
compared to the amount in the first type of account. However, to build a fully Islamic financial 
system, Muslims must pay the price and cannot have the best of both worlds. 
 
26  Islamic Consultative Assembly News Agency, available at http://www.icana.ir/Fa/News/255195, last accessed 28 
December 2015. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Islamic banking has always tried to provide an alternative to conventional banking systems. 
They both have the same function in societies. In other words, all roads lead to Rome. 
However, the Islamic banking road has its own characteristics and requirements. The Islamic 
injunction against riba has major effects and outcomes on the deposit side of Islamic banking 
activities. The post-revolutionary financial system of Iran, as a front runner of Islamic banking, 
has tried to design a risk-free Islamic investment deposit account based on the PLS scheme in 
which depositors can receive profits on a monthly basis, which is quite similar to interest-based 
banking. Thereupon, Iranian banks came up with the provisional profit payment scheme. The 
current scheme totally changes the structure of PLS and makes it a risk-free and safe business. 
The contemporary practice of provisional profit is contrary to the principles of Shari’ah. It is 
easy to infer that Iranian banks have tried to prevent a cash-flow problem.  
The Act should be amended. To honor Islamic values, the financial system of Iran needs to 
incorporate two types of accounts: one based on the PLS scheme, where depositors share 
profits and losses in proportion to their fund contributions, and the other one based on the 
hire-purchase contract and installment transactions with a fixed rate of return, where 
depositors receive risk-free, fixed, and definite monthly profits. 
 
 
